entirely upon achieving success at the tactical level 8 . In short, if the infantry attack could not be driven home, the possibility of obtaining decisive victory, too, was jeopardized.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the face of battle had indeed changed. Weapons like the breech-loading needle gun, so named because it used a long, needle-like striker to fire its cartridge, gave the Prussians a decisive edge over the Danes in the Schleswig-Holstein War in 1864, and over the Austrians in the War of 1866 9 . Its rate of fire was three times that of the muzzle-loader; and it allowed the soldier to load and fire in the prone position, thus reducing his exposure to enemy fire 10 . Consequently, at engagements like Lundby, the Prussians inflicted casualties on the Danes at a rate of about thirty to one 11 . Likewise, at the battle of Podol, the Prussians defeated an Austrian counter-attack, inflicting losses at a rate of nearly ten to one 12 . Such was the pace of technological change, however, that by the Franco-Prussian War the needle gun was already obsolete. The French chassepot exceeded it in range by more than 1,000 yards, offered greater accuracy even at close range, and was capable of a higher rate of fire 13 . Consequently, at battles like Spichern and St. Privat, the Prussians lost more than twice as many casualties as the French. In fact, at St. Privat, the Prussian Guard Division suffered over 8,000 casualties, more than half its combat strength, in a single frontal assault that lasted less than twenty minutes 14 . »These faults«, wrote Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, »were due not to particular individuals [... but to] the system and the principles followed. [...] New inventions entail changes, and the old movements, which we have loved, pass away like dreams 15 .« By the 1880's, in fact, third-generation rifled weapons like the Lebel, the Lee-Enfield, and the numerous variants of the Mauser had already surpassed the range, accuracy, and rate of fire of the chassepot. In addition, the rapidly evolving machine gun offered immense fire potential to the defender; and the invention of smokeless powder meant that he could fire effectively without revealing his position or obscuring his line of sight 16 .
To be sure, the rapid improvement in the overall effectiveness of infantry weapons had given rise to much uncertainty regarding the future role of the other combat arms as well 17 . Forecasts for the horse soldier were mixed. The successful but costly charge of Major-General Adalbert von Bredow's cavalry brigade at Vionville/Mars-la-Tour sustained the optimism of some officers of the mounted service who wanted to believe that mass cavalry formations, armed with saber and lance, could still be as decisive on the battlefield as they were in the Napoleonic era. »Von Bredow's Death Ride« resulted in nearly fifty percent casualties (380 of 800 officers and men), but relieved serious pressure against the Prussian left flank on the 16th of August 1870 18 .
In light of the dismal failures of both French and Prussian horsemen at Morsbrunn, Sedan, and Rezonville, however, most German military thinkers agreed with what Moltke had written in 1858, namely, that improved firearms had severely »restricted the effectiveness of cavalry« 19 . After the war against France, for instance, Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen had written that: »Owing to the extension of the sphere of effect of firearms, the efficiency of cavalry in battle has undergone a considerable diminution. [...] The times of gigantic cavalry successes, such as those at Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf, are forever past 20 .« Following the Boer War, the bold and irrepressible Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849 -1930 declared that the increased range and rate of fire of modern weaponry had driven the cavalry from its »former place of honor on the open plains of the battlefields.« 21 Similarly, shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, the prominent tactical theorist, Colonel Wilhelm Balck (1858 -1924 , observed that, »the individual infantryman, armed with a loaded rifle and trained to use his bayonet, is superior to the individual mounted man, [...] and if he remains calm and keeps his enemy in view, [...] he is superior to several mounted men 22 .« By the eve of the Great War, therefore, 16 The offensive potential of the machine gun was also recognized, Richter, »Verstärke-rung der Feuerkraft der Infanterie«, Militär-Wochenblatt (Hereafter, M-W) No. 21, (1907): 461-66; and Wilhelm Balck, Taktik, 6 Vols. (Berlin, 1908) (London, 1909), 9-10. 22 Balck, Taktik (see fn. 16), I, 258. the cavalry's »right of existence« as a separate arm of service had fallen into question 23 . Cavalry might conduct »brave deeds« in future war, but many officers felt that its role would be limited merely to reconnaissance, pursuit, and outpost duties -an opinion also shared by military analysts across the Channel 24 .
In addition, the greater range, accuracy, and rate of fire of modern weaponry threatened to defeat two of the artillery arm's primary missions, counter-battery fire and fire in support of an attack. By the 1870's, Prussian artillery could fire to a range of 5,000 paces, though its maximum effective range was normally 2,000-2,500 paces. In fact, its accuracy at medium to long range was such that a duel between artillery detachments at 1,000-2,000 paces would, according to Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, »in a short time end with the annihilation of one or the other of them« 25 . This meant that artillery could no longer ignore, even temporarily, the fire of a hostile battery in order to perform another mission, like firing in support of an assault 26 . Moreover, while the accuracy of European cannon had increased for mid-to long ranges, the effectiveness of case-shot, generally employed at 300-500 paces, or less, for close support or self-defense, had not significantly improved since the days of smooth-bore cannon. Hence, the new improvements in infantry firearms now meant that a company of riflemen could outshoot an artillery battery at close range. As Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen explained: »at 800 paces infantry fire cannot be ignored [...] at 300 paces it becomes decisive [...] at 100 paces it may be called annihilating 27 .« Thus, artillery detachments were forced to remain at a distance of about 800 paces when supporting an infantry assault, or suffer considerable losses 28 . But, artillery positioned at that distance, safe from the fire of enemy infantry, would soon find its line of fire blocked by friendly troops advancing on the objective and, thus, be unable to provide them fire support when it was most needed. Thus, the artillery now faced the problem of attempting simultaneously to neutralize enemy guns while also placing mass preparatory fires on the objective. The obvious solution of splitting available batteries left too few to accomplish either mission effectively.
To compound the artillery dilemma, improvements in cannon, munitions, and powder occurred rapidly in the late nineteenth century. Prussia entered the war against France with an artillery piece that was far superior to that in use in the French army. By 1897, however, the French 75mm, »Mademoiselle SoixanteQuinze« (Miss Seventy-five), appeared, which possessed a better recoil mecha- MGM 55 (1996) Antulio J. Echevarria II nism, and thus a higher rate of fire (twenty to thirty rounds per minute) than the German 77mm gun (eight rounds per minute). The efficiency of the French gun was quickly demonstrated during the Boxer Rebellion when 300 Zuaves and a pair of 75mm's captured a Chinese village defended by 2,000 Boxers. The accuracy, rate of fire, and excellent fire and movement techniques employed by the commander of the 75mm's resulted in the village falling into the hands of the French at the cost of only one man wounded. The Germans answered the French challenge in 1905 by upgrading their 77mm gun, the model 96, so that it could fire twenty rounds per minute . By this time, all major European armies possessed some version of a quick-loading cannon comparable to the French 75mm.
II. Solutions
Moltke's response to this »crisis« in warfighting involved combining the advantages of flank attacks and the tactical defensive -enticing the enemy to attack, waiting for the right moment to smash his assault with overwhelming firepower, then finishing him off with an annihilating counterattack 30 . But this solution had obvious limitations in that it required either an available flank for the assaulting force, or an enemy willing to attack first. While in the mid-nineteenth century it was not difficult to find both, the emergence of mass conscript armies by the turn of the century meant that the former, at least, would be harder to obtain. Thus, since another conflict with France seemed a matter of when rather than whether, what the Imperial army needed from its officers were fresh solutions concerning how to drive home an attack while avoiding the devastating effect of modern weaponry. It was to this tactical challenge, then, that the epigones ultimately rose.
The Infantry Attack
A primary concern for infantry tacticians was the conduct of the final assault, that is, crossing the last 300 meters or so of the enemy's fire-zone to the objective proper 31 . For, at this distance the defender's rifle fire became significantly more accurate: individual riflemen could distinguish point from area targets and deliver aimed rather than unaimed (or rapid) fire 32 . At the same time, the attacker's supporting artillery and his line of skirmishers had to cease their suppressive fires to avoid committing fratricide 33 . Thus, the attacking infantry had to rely on its own suppressive fires, and had to maneuver effectively in the face of an enemy who, unbothered by any kind of harassing or indirect fire, could now concentrate its collective firepower on defeating the assault.
Advancing against this kind of direct fire, as the Prussian Guard had illustrated at St. Privat, could be nigh impossible. Indeed, covering the last few yards of the assault constituted what Balck would have called the moment of crisis for the infantry attack, when »victory and defeat are separated by a thin line« 34 . Barely a decade later, however, the advent of the machine gun and third-generation firearms had already extended the critical zone to between 600 and 700 meters, thus calling into question the feasibility of crossing any open terrain controlled by enemy fire 35 . The situation became even more acute when, evaluating the events of the Russo-Japanese War, tacticians discovered that, in lieu of an available flank to assault, infantry might have to conduct extremely difficult and costly breakthrough operations 36 .
The epigones' solutions to the problem of successfully driving home the infantry attack evolved into two diametrically opposed schools of thought, each reflecting not only radically different visions of future war but wholly distinct conceptions of the role of the future warrior as well 37 . The first, which was rather traditionalist in nature, emerged as early as 1872, directly in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and called for the use of standard (or slightly modified) close-order attack formations (.Normalangriff) based on conventional principles of 
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Antulio J. Echevarria II fire and maneuver 38 . Major Wilhelm von Scherff (1834 -1911 and Captain Albrecht von Boguslawski (1834 Boguslawski ( -1905 , who had served as company-grade officers in the war against France and who represent some of the earliest proponents of this position, advocated: 1) abolishing the battalion column in favor of the smaller, more maneuverable company column, which would thus expose fewer friendly troops to enemy fire; and 2) increasing the role of the skirmish line which generally preceded the larger assault formations and had the mission of engaging the enemy with harassing fire 39 . Under the recommendations of Scherff and Boguslawski, skirmishers would have the new mission of softening the enemy by applying direct fire at the point where the assault was to be made 40 . The recommendations of the traditionalists were imminently sound and practicable. Moreover, they had the appeal of requiring only minor modifications to the Imperial army's current attack procedures. Consequently, Scherff's and Boguslawski's proposals found their way into the revised edition of the Infantry Drill Regulations which became official on March 1, 1876. However, these regulations, the product of a committee compromise, were regarded as little more than a temporary answer to the larger issue of doctrinal reform 41 .
The second, more radical solution to the problem of the infantry attack emerged in the mid-to late 1870's. It advocated a free-form style of tactics (Auftragstaktik), employing extended or open-order formations created to fit the particular circumstances of terrain and mission 42 . This solution developed from the premise that technological change had seriously altered the conduct of war to the extent that only a thorough revolution in infantry tactics would accommodate the greater lethality and faster tempo of modern warfare. Major Jules de Verdy du Vernois (1832 Vernois ( -1910 , a veteran of the war against France, a renowned instructor at the War Academy, and German War Minister from 1889 to 1890, was one of the first advocates of this view. As early as 1874-75, he had predicted that, due to the increased lethality of modern infantry weapons, only open-order, skirmishtype formations would be feasible in future wars, an assertion that ran counter to the stern warning in the maneuver regulations of 1861 that such formations were not to be used to conduct an assault 43 Similarly, in 1879, Colonel Sigismund von Schlichting (1828-1909), a company commander in the campaign of 1866 and a battalion commander in the war against France, proposed a series of radical but sound revisions for the Imperial Army's current attack procedures. His important essay, »On the Infantry Battle,« also acknowledged that the dense, close-order battle lines and assault formations which had proved such easy targets for the French chassepot and mitrailleus had become obsolete 44 . He recommended, therefore, abandoning all traditional attack formations in favor of small groups of aggressive skirmishers who would advance under cover of artillery fire, make use of folds in the terrain, and attempt to envelop the enemy's flank 45 . In situations in which the nature of the terrain and density of troop concentrations prevented envelopment, the troops were to »dig in« as close to the objective as possible, then pour concentrated fire on selected points of the enemy's position to weaken it for the final assault 46 . Schlichting also challenged the traditional assumption that a battle would last a single day, arguing that a modern engagement would probably develop over several days, resembling more the character of a siege rather than a classic confrontation over open ground 47 . Like Schlichting, the controversial Bernhardi advocated judicious use of the spade in infantry attacks, called for greater latitude to subordinates, and stressed the importance of individual initiative on the battlefield 48 . Although the rather independently-minded Bernhardi did not formally ally himself with Schlichting, and, in fact, disagreed with him on many issues, he, too, believed that the faster tempo of modern war required the standardization, as far as possible, of routine procedures, which would at least partially free the commander and his staff from the ever-present, time-consuming minutiae of the battlefield 49 . 56 . In fact, the traditionalists were quick to point out that British units in the Boer War generally suffered losses at less than a third the rate of German ones in the war against France; they thus emphasized that a successful attack, like any other operation, required proper planning and coordination, and should follow sound military principles like the concentration of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point . As an alternative to the free-form, open-order tactics advocated by the reformists, the traditionalists proposed pushing attacking infantry forward in short bounds of small, mutually supporting line formations, firing as they advanced 58 .
The Future of Cavalry Doctrinal discussions in the cavalry branch were somewhat less heated, but no less crucial and, ultimately, just as forward-looking as those in the infantry. Not surprisingly, many horse soldiers remained determined to preserve the essentials of the cavalry tradition -the saber and the charge. These were more than the unique hallmarks of the cavalry; they were an integral part of its military culture, the center of its way of life 59 . Their forfeiture meant a loss of identity; indeed, as previously mentioned, the crisis for the cavalry branch revolved around the question of its very existence. On the one hand, non-cavalry soldiers like Moltke and Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen viewed the changed circumstances of late-nineteenthcentury warfighting more objectively than their comrades in the mounted arm. Hence, they remained skeptical about the future role of the horse soldier, believing that modern firearms had restricted him to attacks against disorganized units, or to reconnaissance, security, and pursuit missions 60 . At best, their assessments implied an inevitable loss of prestige for the cavalry as it transitioned to an auxilliary arm. At worst, they gently foretold of the branch's ultimate demise. On the other hand, decorated cavalry officers like generals Carl von Schmidt (1817-1875), Moritz von Bissing (1844 -1917 , and Gerhard von Pelet-Narbonne (1840 -1909 struggled to preserve their branch and its long-lived tradition. Schmidt, a renowned veteran of the war against France and a leading participant in the Cavalry Commissions of 1872 and 1873, which were responsible for revising the Imperial army's Cavalry Drill Regulations, encouraged placing more emphasis on dismounted forms of combat 61 . But, he also fought to retain the charge as the cavalry's primary tactic. Schmidt advocated revamping the »Three-Column Tactic« (Drei-Treffentaktik), a hold-over from the days of Frederick the Great, in such a way that the cavalry would be reorganized into three specially trained groups or columns -breakthrough, maneuver, and support -in order to successfully execute the charge 62 .
General Bissing, a champion of mass tactics, insisted even as late as 1902, that the war of 1870-71 was still the best source for lessons on the role of cavalry in modern warfighting; and in a manner of speaking, he was correct 63 . Assessing the future of any military arm based on the wars between 1871 and 1914 was a difficult task, indeed, for each of the conflicts that occured during that period possessed certain peculiarities which rendered the lessons drawn from it less than universal. In evaluating the events of the Russo-Japanese War, for example, experienced cavalryman, Pelet-Narbonne, veteran of the Wars of Unification and author of several essays and articles on cavalry tactics, noted that the campaign in the east did not permit a definitive statement on the future of cavalry . The terrain in Manchuria was not suitable to large-scale cavalry operations, the Japanese possessed a very small cavalry force, and the Russians used their's poorly 65 . Accordingly, the Russo-Japanese War merely showed that cavalry could be decisive when directed against the enemy's flank or rear, a retreating force, or an army's lines of communication and supply 66 . Military history, it was becoming painfully clear, provided only the most ambiguous of answers to the most pressing of tactical questions. Notoriously outspoken, but nonetheless on the cutting edge of military thought, the effusive Bernhardi took energetic issue with generals Schmidt, Bissing, and Pelet-Narbonne, rejecting outright the use of shock tactics and the DreiTreffentaktik 67 . His recommendations for the employment of cavalry in future war emphasized avoiding the direct fire of the enemy and optimizing the arm's »most striking characteristic«, indeed, its »justification for being« -its superior mobility 68 . This mobility, as Bemhardi reminded everyone, offered virtually untapped strategic (and operational)'potential. Cavalry might serve as a corps or army reserve, for instance, employed against the flank or rear of the enemy 69 . (Indeed, one wonders what might have happened at the first Battle of the Marne had General Alexander von Kluck planned for and executed such measures.) Such maneuvers would effect sudden concentrations of force against an unsuspecting enemy. In any case, when engaged, cavalry must always dismount and fight on foot, which Bernhardi considered more than a necessary evil; it was the proper tactic for modern combat 70 . Thus, lacking only an augur's sense for the invention of armor plate and the other technologies required to effect a breakthrough on the modern battlefield, Bemhardi's ideas had, in fact, anticipated the fundamental principles of twentieth-century maneuver warfare; they were thus about twenty years ahead of their time. But they, too, could not prevent a certain loss, or at least re-definition, of the cavalry's identity.
The Artillery Dilemma
Respected artillerists Ernst von Hoffbauer (1833 -1905 and Adolph von Schell (1837-1888) numbered among the first to tackle the artillery dilemma. Each had participated in the wars against Austria and France: Schell served as HoheloheIngelfingen's regimental adjutant in 1866, and as a battery commander in 1870; Hoffbauer, wounded badly in 1870, nonetheless, rose to the position of Inspector General of the Artillery Testing Commission after the war. Both officers wrote seminal works on artillery organization and tactics; and their recommendations ultimately led to the formation of permanent artillery regiments (battalions already existed) and brigades with an independent chain of command that supported an army corps 71 . These changes not only provided additional higher-echelon officer assignments for the artillery as a branch, it gave division and corps commanders a specific point of contact -an artillery regiment or brigade commander -with whom they could coordinate the unit's fires, as well as additional fire-support elements that could be attached at division level 72 . They also advised dividing the battle area into three distinct fire zones (1500 meters and greater, 1000-1500 meters, and less than 1000 meters) for better control of available fires 73 . From this arrangement a system for prioritizing fire developed which allocated target priorities in concert with the phases of the infantry battle. Based on the examples of the war against France and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Hoffbauer and Schell had recommended that the attacker's artillery first defeat or drive off the guns of the defender, by means of the »artillery duel«, before the infantry attack commenced. To accomplish this, they advised using overlapping and enfilading fires to achieve the effect of mass fire without necessarily massing batteries, thereby avoiding the extended target they would normally present to the enemy 74 .
The recommendations of Hoffbauer and Schell, supported, incidentally, by infantry officers like Scherff and Boguslawski, became part of German artillery doctrine in the early 1890's 75 . Although the new German drill regulations formally standardized artillery procedures before-, during-, and after the battle, they did not limit subordinate commanders so much as they provided clarity and direction. In the Prusso-German army, for example, artillery commanders retained significant latitude to organize and deploy their units according to the situation, thus preserving the »artful« element of war. In the French army, on the other hand, artillery (and some other) regulations tended to restrict the officer's freedom of choice by requiring a priori decisions such as the designation of certain batteries for infantry targets and others for counter-battery fire .
By late the 1890's, the pace of change in cannon technology had already pushed the artillery dilemma into a new phase. The recoil mechanizisms that had given rise to »quick-firers« had also allowed artillery to be dug in and protected with overhead cover -a great boon to the defender, for his artillery was now less vulnerable to the preparatory bombardment of the attacker and could concentrate the bulk of its ordinance on defeating the advancing infantry. Hence, the artillery duel, as a specific phase of the infantry attack, had become indecisive 77 . This development, in turn, jeopardized the successful accomplishment of the second phase of the infantry attack since both, the advancing infantry and its accompanying artillery, were now exposed to the undiminished fire of the defender's cannon. This new phase of the artillery dilemma gave rise to a short but heated debate reflecting the classic conflict between older values, those steeped in tradition and romantic notions of honor, and newer ones concerned with innovation and change. (Of course, such values are not mutually exclusive.) The debate centered on the merits and demerits of covered and concealed fighting positions for the field artillery. Proponents of covered positions, like Captain von Eberhard, cited the apparent effectiveness of overhead cover in reducing artillery casualties during the Russo-Japanese War 78 . Their opponents, on the other hand, maintained that such measures would create insuperable difficulties for command and control, and for the rapid displacement of batteries from one position to the next as the artillery moved in support of the advancing infantry 79 . Representing the latter view, General Heinrich von Rohne (1842 Rohne ( -1908 , one of Imperial Germany's most prominent artillery theorists, called the »desire for cover« a »sickness«, arguing that the new shields attached to German guns adequately protected the gunners 80 . In fact, a metal shield affixed to the gun did, indeed, increase the survivability of the crew, rendering the gunners less vulnerable to either infantry (though not sniping) or counter-battery (shrapnel) fire 81 . Rohne further warned that drawing conclusions from the results of the Russo-Japanese War might be misleading due to numerous deficiencies in Russian and Japanese training and doctrine 82 .
The solution to the artillery dilemma would eventually arrive in the form of a combination of modern technology and a new direction in artillery theory. Advances in communication and transportation technologies -the telephone, wireless, and motor car -coupled with a greater reliance on indirect fire would allow German artillery liason officers, posted with the forward units, to call for and direct fire, even if only rudimentarily, so that artillery batteries could support the infantry without having to maintain visual contact with it 83 . By the First World War, in fact, though out-gunned by the better French 75mm, artillery procedures in the Imperial army had become closely integrated with those of the infantry, creating a proto-combined arms approach to the conduct of battle. Also, the value of heavy artillery, discussed in detail before the war, was duly recognized; French divisions and corps possessed no medium or heavy artillery, while their German counterparts had eighteen light (105-mm) and sixteen heavy (150-mm) howitzers respectively.
III. Conclusions
In the half century preceding the First World War, Europeans saw not only vast and varied advances in science and technology, they encountered them at a pace hitherto unknown in western society. Revolutionary inventions appeared at an accelerating rate. The cable car (1879) made mass transit possible in inner cities. Wireless telegraphy (1897) unshackled sender and receiver from elaborate systems of cable and wire. The first practical submarines (1893), automobiles (1895), airships (1900), and airplanes (1909) added new dimensions to every-day travel, not to mention the conduct of war. Moreover, science and technology sometimes interacted in mutually reinforcing, non-linear ways. A seemingly insignificant discovery in one field might act with unrelated elements in another to produce dramatic and disproportionate effects. The new »hardening« processes of the 1890's, for example, led to the production of cheap steel plates which, in combination with quickly developing heavy industries, allowed Japan, Italy, Germany, and the United States to build large navies which, in turn, ultimately destabilized the global maritime balance of power before 1914. Indeed, this period experienced the despair of an imminent and arbitrary material and spiritual obsolescence that popular theories like Social Darwinism only appeared to explain.
Fin-de-siegle
Europe also witnessed accelerating developments that affected the socio-cultural, political, and economic dimensions of war. The growth of a prosperous middle class and the emergence of an industrial proletariat introduced new social structures that offered fertile soil for the rise of anti-war ideologies like socialism and pacifism. The intensification of nationalistic sentiments since the French Revolution made war more susceptible to populist impulses, thereby increasing its inherent risk and weakening the already dubious ability of states to control it. The progress of industrialization and the emergence of mass armies portended great social and economic catastrophes in the event of a general European conflict.
On the tactical level, Europe's soldiers saw the face of battle evolve more rapidly than any previous era. If the railroad and needle gun altered it in 1864 and 1866, the mitrailleuse and chassepot did so again in 1870-71. Smokeless powder and third-generation rifles like the Lebel and the Lee Enfield forced another face lift in the 1880's, while improved recoil mechanisms and the Maxim machine gun altered it again in the 1890's. After the turn of the century, the airship and airplane offered still further possibilities and posed yet additional problems for future warfighting. Fin-de-siecle military theorists thus faced the unique task of attempting to come to terms with the changing conduct of war even as its instruments remained in fluid transformation before them. Yet, even as Imperial Germany's military writers felt the earliest waves of this »future shock«, they struggled, and for the most part effectively, to adapt their battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures to hitherto unimagined technological advances.
To be sure, the ideas of the Imperial Army's reformists initially encountered more resistance than support 84 . After all, their recommendations ultimately threatened something intangible but dear to ä tradition-minded institution, its self-image. Moreover, the Imperial Army's tactical discussions had as much to do with adapting to technological change as with the personal antagonizisms and professional jealousies that go hand in hand with the competitive spirit of military culture. Nonetheless, the resistance evident in these debates proved healthy for German military thinking; for it provided a dialectical tension that challenged the need for reform, forcing its proponents to clarify and justify their ideas. Such challenges provided a necessary stabilizing effect in a very fluid present.
While tactical innovators like Schlichting and Bernhardi enjoyed little direct influence in the Prusso-German officer corps, many of their ideas, in fact, survived, transformed in the course of the debate to become, surprisingly, canon. They either found their way into the Imperial Army's doctrinal instruments and, in some cases, into its practice, or were adopted by later generations to solve similar tactical problems. Schlichting's solution to the problem of pushing home the infantry attack through free-form, open-order Auftragstaktik, in fact, prefigured the advent of storm-troop tactics in the middle of the First World War 85 . This »democratization« of infantry formations would, in turn, develop into the infiltration tactics which have become an integral part of the repertoire of modern armies. Even the solutions proposed by Scherff and Boguslawski, the opponents of radical doctrinal change, were built upon sound principles of fire and maneuver, and would later evolve into small-unit movement techniques like bounding overwatch, a modern method of maneuvering friendly forces against direct enemy fire 86 . Bernhardi's recommendations for future use of German cavalry found at least partial expression in the initial phases of the First World War; mounted units were used not only in reconnaissance and security missions, but also as operational and strategic reserves when cavalry corps were transferred from one front to the next, and from one army to another 87 .
The constant iteration of certain principles in German military publications between 1871-1914 does indeed create the impression that the military theories of the epigones had grown stagnant and dogmatic. The German fundamental conception of strategy as the use of battles to win wars remained unchanged well after World War I; and its field maneuvers between 1905 and 1914 reflect a certain penchant for, if not infatuation with, flank-or enveloping attacks 88 . However, a careful examination of the professional treatises and essays, instruments that capture military thought in all its dimensions, reveals that the epigones' efforts to adjust to rapid advances in military technology were far from misguided and ineffective. Indeed, only the rapid pace of changö itself prevented the full synthesis of military thought and new technology before 1914 .
That the Imperial Army's tactical innovations failed to fully break the stalemate of trench warfare also owes something to the dearth of operational means available for exploiting tactical successes, and to the fact that some advances in technology can only be overcome by subsequent ones. That battlefield execution of military theory in World War I was not more uniform owes much to the hasty training and horrific turnover of junior leaders, especially in the first ten to fifteen months of the war when, in fact, the High Command had to admit that its core of »old infantry [...] 
